17 hours ago
7
For almost 27 years, the Venezuelan military – formally known as the National Bolivarian Armed Forces (FANB) – was a firm ally to presidents Hugo Chavez and Nicolas Maduro, as they systematically drifted from seeking an alternative to Western liberal democracy, and towards authoritarianism.
The FANB helped the Venezuelan government dismantle the institutions of the previous political establishment and persecute its most fervent opponents. In exchange, the governments of Chavez and Maduro, respectively, gave more and more power to the military within Venezuelan politics, offering them ministerial positions, governorships, embassies and other leadership roles such as mayoralties or the administration of state-run enterprises.
Now, with the abduction of Maduro by United States special forces last Saturday, the military’s image as a protector of the Venezuelan state has taken a hit: The deposed president was kidnapped from the largest Venezuelan military complex, Fuerte Tiuna, in an operation that exposed the deficiencies in the FANB’s military technology and defence protocols.
The military faces a crucial dilemma – make changes and serve as the guarantor of the deals fronted by the Donald Trump administration in the US and interim president Delcy Rodriguez in Caracas, or risk further US attacks and erosion of its power and status.
The rise before the fall
Over the years, the FANB’s influence has grown significantly, including in law enforcement – supplanting, in many cases, the roles of the state and local police.
This phenomenon accelerated after the presidential elections of July 28, 2024, when the then-government of Maduro faced an unprecedented legitimacy crisis amid strong accusations of widespread vote-counting fraud.
A police state was established in Venezuela, in which mass surveillance of opponents moved to a new level.
The government, back then and until now, came to depend on the FANB to remain standing. In part, this was done by incorporating into the military elements of the ruling United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV), paramilitary groups (also called “colectivos”), and the political, judicial and military police. This entire security framework has been described by the Venezuelan government as a “civic-military-police union.”
The post-Maduro era
That power means that the military retains a critical role in any political transition in Venezuela. Many analysts believe that any government established in Venezuela, whether via democratic means or through force, needs the support of the military to be able to govern.
The case of Delcy Rodriguez’s administration is no exception to this rule. Despite counting on Trump’s acquiescence to take the reins of a post-Maduro political transition, the president in charge of Venezuela needs the support of the Venezuelan military to avoid a possible aggravation of political and social tensions in Venezuela. Rodriguez’s acceptance among military ranks is the weightiest reason why the US president has trusted her – rather than opposition leader Maria Corina Machado – to lead the political transition in the country.
But the abduction of Maduro has, at the same time, shown up the weaknesses of the FANB. Its insurmountable asymmetry of power in relation to the US military’s might leaves Venezuela vulnerable to possible new attacks coming from the US, even though Trump has, for the moment, said he has no such plans.
That threat is the biggest incentive for the FANB to itself make compromises, and is the reason why the military leadership might be open to being a part of the political transition led by Rodriguez.
What’s next for the military?
The Venezuelan military will want, as much as possible, to maintain its status within Venezuelan politics.
To achieve this objective, the FANB leadership will likely need to comply with a series of steps, some of which were – until recently – unthinkable in Venezuelan politics.
First, military leaders must dissociate themselves from all accusations linking them to drug trafficking activities, the official argument used by the US for its military campaign against Venezuela.
Second, the military leadership must accept the new oil agreement between Venezuela and the US, which will very likely grant US companies significant control over Venezuelan crude reserves and production.
Third, it is possible that, at some point in the Venezuelan political transition, the FANB will need to reduce its repressive activities against the Venezuelan civilian population. This means, in practice, the reduction of its role in the current police state, or the so-called “Civic-Military-Police Union”.
Finally, the Venezuelan military leadership must close ranks with the interim president, Rodriguez, because she represents the only – and perhaps the last – direct channel of communication with the Trump administration. The military could argue domestically that it needs to do this in order to shore up the country’s stability amid the chaos generated by Maduro’s exit.
Fundamentally, adopting these changes would mean that the military underwrites the agreements reached between Rodriguez and Trump, and plays the role of a stabilising agent in the country’s post-Maduro era. It’s a format the US is used to, as well, with Washington relying on military-led establishments in multiple countries over the decades, from Egypt to Pakistan to Thailand to many more.
For the Venezuelan military, the options today are few. Failing to adapt and work with Trump and Rodriguez could invite a new US armed attack. Were this to occur, it would destroy the credibility of the military and current political leadership, further amplifying the country’s political and social instability.
