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In the weeks leading up to the Duma elections, the Kremlin accelerated what is known in the country as “ballot sterilisation”. It removed the remaining risk factors that could demonstrate any form of public dissatisfaction.
Candidates of the so-called managed opposition parties, such as the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), have been arrested or barred from running, thus diminishing the prospect for a protest vote against the governing United Russia. Last month, Yabloko, the only openly antiwar party, was barred from fielding candidates.
In the past, voting for these parties has been encouraged by opposition leaders excluded from running, such as the late Kremlin critic Alexey Navalny, as a form of anti-regime vote.
This time the Kremlin is not taking any chances. Public dissatisfaction is widespread and the risk of a display of dissent at the ballot box is too high to let the managed opposition run freely. The election must produce a result that “proves” national unity and full support for President Vladimir Putin and the governing United Russia party.
The ‘threat’ of the managed opposition
Yabloko is the only surviving officially registered political party in Russia that adheres to democratic principles and openly opposes the war in Ukraine. It has pulled through multiple waves of political repression over the years that destroyed or forced all others into exile.
In July, Yabloko was allowed to register for the Duma elections. The decision to let the party run likely came out of the Kremlin’s desire to show confidence – to claim that elections in Russia are so free that even an openly antiwar party can participate amid the ongoing war with Ukraine.
Yabloko had about 4 percent support just before the election campaign started and was likely going to get between 1 and 2 percent of the vote, like in previous Duma elections – well below the 5 percent threshold to enter the legislature.
What changed? The registration of Yabloko prompted a mass, uncoordinated surge of interest due to its antiwar slogans. Searches in Russia’s top search engine, Yandex, containing the party’s name and the word “elections” increased fivefold , surpassing even those for the governing United Russia.
The explosion of interest in Yabloko was apparent across all popular social media platforms in Russia and was followed by statements of support and calls to vote for the party from exiled political leaders, such as Yulia Navalnaya, Navalny’s widow.
In August, the party’s registration for the election was revoked by the Supreme Court following accusations that it was seeking to undermine the electoral process.
The case of the CPRF is slightly different. It is the second-largest party in the Duma, and it votes on major bills “as requested” with United Russia. It is not openly antiwar, but it has multiple strong regional branches that tend to be more critical of the governing party at the local level, as well as a number of charismatic leading members who have been very vocal about the war’s negative consequences.
By building its campaign around targeted criticism, the CPRF has become a very attractive choice for protest voters.
The party has not been deregistered, but some of its candidates have been removed from the ballot under various pretexts, and a number of restrictions have been imposed that limit its campaigning.
For example, Nikolay Bondarenko, a popular communist with more than two million YouTube subscribers, was banned from participating in the Duma elections for the use of “extremist symbols”; the accusation is based on a social media post featuring Navalny’s photo.
Managing an election
Neither Yabloko nor CPRF would have threatened United Russia’s majority in the Duma if there had been no crackdown.
Years of perfected administrative pressure, investment in e-voting, the introduction of three-day voting, and the elimination of all independent election observers have made it extremely easy for the Kremlin to produce the outcome it desires.
The Kremlin’s political managers set the parameters for the election results in advance of the vote. Currently, the target is 50 percent turnout with 50 percent of the vote for United Russia. Notably, the latter was lowered from 55 to 50 percent due to concerns about growing public dissatisfaction.
So why the crackdown on the systemic opposition?
The elections are being held at a time when the direct consequences of the war in Ukraine are felt by a growing number of Russians. Fuel shortages and rising inflation are increasingly impacting Russian families, especially those who have not sent a member to the front or are working in the war industries.
People are growing more desperate and pessimistic about the future, especially in the more impoverished regions of the country. According to independent pollster Levada Center, public anxiety is at a level not seen since September 2022, when mass mobilisation was announced.
The Kremlin clearly perceives that there is a chance this dissatisfaction could pour out into the ballot boxes, which would necessitate more drastic measures of manipulation to adjust the result to the desired one.
If Yabloko, for example, were to get a double-digit result, this would be a nightmare for the Kremlin’s political managers. Even with all the tools for electoral manipulation at their disposal, it is impossible to make 10 percent into 1 percent without everyone knowing it.
This could elevate the risk of protests or substantially hurt the reputation of President Putin, who this year is personally promoting United Russia.
The results the Kremlin’s political managers must deliver need to demonstrate unity and full support – and those results need to be tacitly accepted by society at large.
The crackdown on the managed opposition, therefore, means that they have turned on overkill mode and are micromanaging every aspect of the electoral process.
The public mood would be a major concern for the Kremlin only until the elections are done. Once the vote has been conducted in a sufficiently satisfactory manner, the state apparatus will have a free hand to intensify political repression and adopt unpopular measures, such as total control over the internet or austerity policies.
The task of the Kremlin’s political managers, like that of the security agencies, is to maintain control no matter what, so that Putin can continue the war in Ukraine for as long as he needs to.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.
